We demonstrate the principle of one-sided device-independent continuous variable (CV) quantum information. In situations of no trust, we show by enactment how the use of standard CV entanglement criteria can mislead Charlie into thinking Alice and Bob share entanglement, when the data is actually generated classically using a Local Hidden Variable theory based on the Wigner function. We distinguish between criteria that demonstrate CV entanglement, and criteria that demonstrate the CV Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) steering paradox. We show that the latter, but not the former, are necessarily one-sided device-independent entanglement witnesses, and can be used by Charlie to signify genuine EPR entanglement, if he trusts only Alice. A monogamy result for the EPR steering paradox confirms security of the shared amplitude values in that case.
I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of trust, either of an observer or of the devices employed, has motivated the emergence of "a new paradigm" [1] in the field of quantum information: device-independent (DVI) quantum information processing [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . In light of this emergence, it is now recognised that quantum nonlocality has a very special role to play in quantum information. In a classic scenario, Charlie wants to confirm whether the qubit values reported to him by Alice and Bob have been generated from an entangled quantum source. For quantum key distribution (QKD), this may allow him to deduce that these values are not known to any eavesdropper, Eve [8, 9] . Quite surprisingly, if Charlie uses certain entanglement criteria, called device-independent entanglement witnesses (DVIEW), he does not have to assume anything about the exact nature of the devices Alice and Bob are using or the reliability of their measurements [2, 3, 10, 11] .
Device-independent entanglement witnesses are those introduced by Bell, that demonstrate not only quantum entanglement, but quantum nonlocality [2] [3] [4] . If Charlie verifies violation of a Bell inequality, he can be sure the statistics did not arise from any local hidden variable (LHV) theory [12] . The concept of quantum nonlocality is distinct from that of entanglement, and DVI security is not given by all entangled states. A problem for the implementation of DVI quantum information however is that when most photons are not detected, not all LHV theories can be eliminated [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . These sorts of "loophole" issues are often overcome by continuous variable (CV) quantum information. Here, information is carried in the amplitudes of fields, enabling efficient detection and transmission [18, 19, [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] . A second problem then arises. The most widely-used CV entangled resource (the two-mode squeezed state) has a LHV description, for the results of Alice and Bob's amplitude measurements [26, 27] . This means that those amplitude values will not violate a Bell inequality.
The amplitude values of the CV entangled resource do display quantum nonlocality however: namely, the nonlocality presented by Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) [28] in their 1935 EPR paradox [29, 30] . EPR's nonlocality addresses whether the action of measurement by Bob can immediately influence the results of Alice's quantum measurements at another distant site. EPR demonstrate their paradox, by assuming that values at Alice's location arise from measurements of quantum observables. There is no similar assumption for Bob's measurements. The EPR paradox is realised through a procedure that is "one-sided device-independent", and criteria for the EPR paradox, different to those for "EPR entanglement", are "one-sided" DVIEW.
The concept of "one-sided device-independent" security has been pioneered in Refs. [31, 33, 34] , based on the resource of quantum steering [32] . In fact, the EPR paradox is an example of quantum steering [33] [34] [35] . The analysis [31] focused on QKD with qubits, but revealed advantages, if one is justified in assuming trust at one site. The advantages are implicit in previous work on CV QKD based on criteria that relate to the EPR paradox [19] [20] [21] . Clearly, this concept has the potential to introduce the "new DVI paradigm" to CV quantum information.
Here, we demonstrate the principle and feasibility of CV one-sided DVI quantum information. We do this in three steps: (1) First, we illustrate the vulnerability of CV quantum information in situations of no trust, if one uses standard entanglement criteria such as that derived by Duan et al [37] and Simon [36] . Our illustration is by enactment: where neither Alice and Bob can be trusted, we deceive Charlie by simulating entanglement trivially using a classical computer. We next show that even if Alice can be trusted, we can still deceive Charlie if he uses a criterion that is not a one-sided DVIEW. The "faked" entanglement can be generated using an unsophisticated hybrid scheme involving classical computers and a classical optical source. We also discuss the motivation by a malicious Eve to fake the entanglement − so that she can fool Charlie into thinking a set of amplitude values are held securely between the two parties, Alice and Bob, when in fact they can be distributed by her to an infinite number of parties.
(2) Second, we prove that if Charlie confirms a one-sided DVI EPR paradox criterion and he trusts Alice, he can be sure the results do originate from an EPR entangled state. (3) Lastly, we use a monogamy result [20, 39, 40] for the EPR paradox to show that confirmation of the EPR paradox criterion is enough to give security against an eavesdropper Eve possessing a noise-free replica of the amplitude values, despite that Bob cannot be trusted.
Practical implementation of CV one-sided DV security requires demonstration of an EPR-steering paradox, which is more generally difficult than entanglement [41] . Nonetheless, the CV EPR paradox has been verified without fair sampling loopholes for a range of optical systems [26, 27, 43] . These will be briefly discussed in the Conclusion. The elimination of the "locality" loophole is also important [17] , if CV DVI is to become a reality. Since security is often comprised at one site only, we expect CV one-sided DVI protocols to become useful.
II. DETECTING SHARED ENTANGLEMENT
Let Alice and Bob be two spatially separated observers at stations labelled A and B respectively. Suppose an observer at a central station sends to Alice one of the quantum subsystems that comprise a CV EPR state, and to Bob the other. A sequence of similarly prepared states is transmitted. After each transmission t i , an observer Charlie selects randomly to ask Alice and Bob to measure either the position X or the momentum P of the subsystems at their respective stations (or sites), and to report to him the values of their measurements [8, 9, 19, [21] [22] [23] . A CV EPR state is a simultaneous eigenstate of momentum-sum and position-difference, and the values given by Alice and Bob will be accordingly correlated. If Charlie determines that these values satisfy an entanglement criterion, then he can confirm that Alice and Bob indeed share an entangled state.
A. Duan-Simon criteria for CV entanglement
The most widely-used CV EPR entanglement criterion is based on the methods of Duan et al and Simon [36] [37] [38] . Entanglement between the systems measured by Alice and Bob is confirmed if
where g is any real constant and we use the notation (∆X) 2 ≡ X 2 − X 2 . Here, X A/B and P A/B are the "position" and "momentum' quadratures measured by Alice and Bob respectively, and we have selected a suitable scaling so that the Heisenberg quantum uncertainty principle is written ∆X∆P ≥ 1/4. Clearly, the CV EPR state will satisfy the condition (1), with g = 1. For more general states, the choice of g is taken optimally so that the left-side of the inequality (1) is minimised. For the Gaussian systems that are most commonly utilised for CV QIP [18] , and restricting to the subclass of Gaussian states with symmetry between position and momentum correlation, this criterion can be shown to be necessary and sufficient for detecting bipartite entanglement [42] .
Before continuing, it is important to understand the assumptions needed in deriving the criterion (1) (and other very similar criteria), since it is these assumptions that create the security loopholes addressed by deviceindependent quantum information processing. To derive the criterion (1), one begins by supposing the bipartite system of Alice and Bob is non-entangled. By definition of entanglement, this means that the bipartite density operator can be written in the separable form [46] 
where here R P (R) = 1 and ρ R A and ρ R B are quantum density operators for Alice's system A and Bob's system B alone. The uncertainty product for the separable mixture is constrained by the uncertainty product for the product states that are the components of the mixture. For product states ρ
where we write the subscript R to remind use the averages are with respect to the component state R (see Refs. [36] [37] [38] for full details). Using the fact that ρ are quantum states, the Heisenberg uncertainty relation applies to each, and it follows that
Thus, if (1) is satisfied, the two systems A and B cannot be represented by (2) and must therefore be entangled. The crucial assumption for the practical application of the criterion by Charlie is that both sets of values, X A , P A and X B , P B , are truly outcomes of measurements of the quantum observables, and are hence correctly constrained for all possible local component states ρ
by the Heisenberg uncertainty relations: ∆ R X A ∆ R P A ≥ 1/4 and ∆ R X B ∆ R P B ≥ 1/4. If Alice and Bob do not report the results of quantum measurements, the criterion cannot be applied to faithfully detect entanglement [4, 31, 33] . Both Alice and Bob must be trusted.
We remark that the well-known simple "Duan" criterion [37] detects entanglement between A and B if
This criterion follows directly from the criterion (1), by taking g = 1 and noting that for any real numbers x and y, x 2 + y 2 ≥ 2xy. Hence, if the simple criterion detects entanglement, so will the more powerful criterion (1) [38] , provided g is optimally chosen. Thus, the results of this paper remain valid if criterion (5) is used instead of (1).
B. EPR-steering criterion as a one-sided DVI criterion for entanglement Entanglement can also be confirmed by the EPR paradox [26, 28] . Such a paradox (also called an EPR steering paradox [33] [34] [35] ) is realised if
where (∆ inf X A|B ) 2 is the variance of the conditional distribution for the measurement X A given a measurement at B [30] , and (∆ inf P A )
2 is defined similarly. The subscript "inf" reminds us of the original formulation of the EPR paradox, in which the emphasis is on an observer, here called Bob, who can make a near-perfect inference of the outcome of a measurement by Alice, even though he is spatially separated from Alice's measurement station. For Gaussian systems, meaning Gaussian states and measurements, this criterion has been shown necessary and sufficient to detect EPR steering [34] .
On selecting (∆ inf X A ) 2 and (∆ inf P A ) 2 to be the variances conditional on measurements X B , and P A , respectively, we see that the CV EPR state will satisfy this EPR condition. The EPR paradox criterion can then more specifically be written as
where g is a real constant optimised so that the left side of inequality (7) is minimised. We now briefly summarise the assumptions needed to derive the EPR criteria, for comparison with those needed to derive the Duan/ Simon-type entanglement criteria. The key point is that the EPR steering criteria are based on fewer assumptions [31] , and are useful for CV one-sided DVI quantum information processing.
The EPR criteria can be derived using the extension of EPR argument, in which Bob is able to predict the result for Alice's X A or P A measurement to an uncertainty given by ∆ inf X and ∆ inf P , respectively [27, 30] . In their argument, EPR make the assumption that certain premises (referred to as EPR's local realism LR) will hold. They use these premises to deduce that there is a local realistic description for Alice's measurements, in which the results for X A and P A are simultaneously predetermined to a precision ∆ inf X and ∆ inf P , which of course when ∆ inf X A ∆ inf P A < 1/4 contradicts any local quantum state description. Then, the EPR paradox is established, because LR implies a local description at A that is inconsistent with (the completeness of) quantum mechanics.
The alternative proof in which the criterion is proven to be one for EPR-steering involves similar assumptions [35] . In fact, the proofs for EPR steering follow along parallel lines to those for entanglement. For the EPRsteering proof, separability takes the more general form of Bell's Local Hidden Variable (LHV) model [12] . This may be likened to first step in the EPR argument, where the assumption of EPR's local realism is made [20] . On expansion, we see that the criteria involve second order moments such as
For all LHV models, these can be expressed in the separable form
where λ are classical "hidden variable" parameters and P (λ) is the probability distribution for these parameters. The λ correspond to the R in (2) and at the various steps in the proof. The X θ A λ is the average value for the result X θ A , given the hidden variable state specified by λ. The X φ B λ is defined similarly. Manipulation based on this LHV assumption reveals the result (3) will once more hold, but with λ replacing R. However, after this step, different to the proof for entanglement, the two subsystems are treated asymmetrically. For Alice's measurements, consistency with local quantum states ρ λ A is again assumed, so that the Heisenberg uncertainty relation holds i.e. ∆ λ X A ∆ λ P A ≥ 1 4 . This may be likened to the step in the EPR argument where the "elements of reality" for Alice's local states are compared for consistency with quantum mechanics [20] . However, no such assumption is made about Bob's local system or measurements. It is only assumed that the variances are positive i.e. ∆ λ X B ∆ λ P B ≥ 0. With these assumptions, we find
The LHV model with the additional constraint for local states at A is called an LHS model [33] . This LHS model will imply
. Violation of the inequality (7) is therefore an EPR paradox, and quantum steering of A by B [33, 35] .
We see from both derivations that it is necessary to assume Alice does indeed report the results of the appropriate quantum measurements, if the EPR steering criterion is to be valid. However, different to the DuanSimon entanglement criteria, i t is not necessary to make this assumption about Bob's measurements. Thus, the criterion is independent of the devices used at Bob's measurement station. Regardless of the orgin of Bob's values, the criterion is still valid for detecting the EPR steering paradox. Only Alice must be trusted.
In detecting the EPR steering paradox, the criterion will also detect entanglement [27, 33] . This is because any separable description (2) will also imply the LHV expansion (8) , with or without the assumption of the uncertainty relation ∆ λ X A ∆ λ P A ≥ 1 4 , and therefore cannot generate an EPR steering paradox. Separable models are subsets of LHV and LHS models. The EPR criterion is therefore a one-sided device-independent criterion for entanglement.
It has been observed [41] that the EPR paradox criterion (6) to less robust to noise and losses than the Duan-Simon entanglement criterion (1) . The EPR paradox criterion does not detect all entangled states. This is because of the different assumptions made about the Figure 1 . Faking the CV entanglement using classical protocols where the measurement stations of Alice and Bob cannot be trusted: Two classical number pairs representing position and momentum are generated probabilistically (by Eve) from the computer using the Wigner function (11) and are sent to Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob fake entanglement by reporting these numbers to Charlie, who then verifies "entanglement" using either the Duan-Simon criterion (1) or the EPR criterion (6) (Figure 3, curves (a) and (b) ). Security is compromised because the amplitude values can be shared by an infinite number of parties in this case.
nature of Bob's measurements. For Eq. (1), the measurements X B and P B at Bob's location must genuinely correspond to those of the quantum conjugate observables. For the EPR criterion, this assumption about Bob's measurements is not made. The EPR criterion (6) makes fewer assumptions than can be justified if one can indeed trust Alice and Bob to make the right measurements, and is as a consequence less sensitive to detecting entanglement. The criterion is more generally difficult to satisfy, but has the advantage of being (equivalent to) a one-sided DVIEW [2] [3] [4] .
III. FAKING CV ENTANGLEMENT
It may be that Alice and Bob (or their devices) cannot be trusted, and do not report to Charlie the values of measured quantum quadrature phase amplitudes. Instead, they may report values that have been created by a classical computer simulation. Then, we will show that the entanglement criteria of the last section can be satisfied even though there is no entanglement. We call this "faked entanglement". The faking of the entanglement is possible, because the assumptions made in the derivation of the criteria are no longer valid. In this paper, we illustrate the faking of entanglement in two scenarios: first, where neither Alice nor Bob can be trusted (Figure 1) , in which case neither criterion (1) or (6) is valid; and second, where only Alice can be trusted (Figure 2 ), in which case only the EPR criterion (6) is valid.
The implications can be understood by considering a motivation for the faking protocol. In the scenario of Section II, Charlie has transmitted to Alice and Bob the particles or light fields that form the two subsystems of an entangled EPR state. He wants Alice and Bob to report the results of their measurements of either X or P at each site, for a sequence t i of such transmissions, so that he can confirm entanglement by taking the appropriate averages required by the entanglement criteria (1) or (6) . Once he confirms entanglement, the amplitude values that are shared by Alice and Bob become useful for QIP tasks, for example, for CV quantum key distribution (QKD) [8, 22] . The sequence t i that is used to test for entanglement does not have to be exhaustive, so a sequence of unrevealed correlated amplitudes can remain secret to the stations of Alice and Bob. Now suppose a devious Eve seeks to trick Charlie, Alice and Bob. We will show how she can create from a computer a sequence of numbers x A , p A , x B , p B that mimic the results for measurements X A , P A , X B , P B respectively, in that they will satisfy the inequalities of the entanglement criteria (1) and (6) 
on an entangled state, there could be serious consequences. The amplitudes of the whole sequence are not secure, but can be shared by an infinite number of parties, since the sequence is formerly known to Eve and can be distributed by her. The validity of QKD based on the assumption of an entangled state is destroyed.
We now illustrate by example the method of faking entanglement. The standard realisation of the CV EPR state is the two-mode squeezed state [44] :
where |n A/B are the number states of modes at the locations A/B of Alice and Bob respectively, and r ≥ 0 is the squeeze parameter that determines the amount of entanglement between the modes of Alice and Bob. The Wigner function for this state is
where σ 2 + = exp(2r) and σ 2 − = exp(−2r) and we introduce the notation x = (x A , p A , x B , p B ) [45] . The moments of the quadrature phase amplitudes are given directly by the amplitude moments of the distribution. The positivity of the Wigner function allows for a perfectly accurate probabilistic simulation of the entangled quadrature correlations, based on the measurements of X θ A/B . This fact, pointed out by Bell [47] , is well-known [26] . The implication is that if the Charlie restricts to a criterion based on quadrature measurements, and if Alice and Bob or their devices cannot be trusted, he can be fooled into thinking there is entanglement shared between them when there is not.
Hence, an alternative realisation of the process of detecting the correlations given by (1) or (6) is as follows. At transmission time t i , a central source Eve generates with probability W (x) the values x A , p A , x B and p B , and sends them to Alice and Bob (Figure 1 ). The process is repeated N times, a different set of numbers being probabilistically generated on each trial t i . When Charlie calls for the value of transmission t i , Alice gives to him the value x A or p A , depending on whether Charlie asked her (and Bob) to measure position or momentum. Similarly, Bob reports his value, x B or p B . Charlie evaluates the averages as required for the criteria (1) and (6) . The averages are precisely consistent with the predictions of the two-mode squeezed state, and both criteria are satisifed for all r. Specifically, we find (on selecting the optimal value for g in (1), namely g = 1)
and (on optimising the choice of measurements at B and selecting the optimal value for g in (7), namely g = tanh 2r [30] )
We carry out the procedure of Figure 1 , and illustrate the faking of the quantum entanglement by classical means in Figures 3, 4 and 5. A possible set of "Eve's numbers" is presented in Figure 5 . Despite that the data satisfy the entanglement criteria (1), (5) and (6), (7), there is no possibility of security, because the amplitude values can be distributed from the source to an infinite number of other parties. The undermining of the security occurs because neither of the entanglement criteria (1) or (6) used by Charlie are (equivalent to) DVIEW. The particular moments evaluated by Charlie can be constructed using a Local Hidden Variable (LHV) theory [2, 3] based on the use of the positive Wigner function (11) [26, 47] . This is true for all Gaussian states, defined as describable by a positive Gaussian Wigner function [18] . As explained in the last Section, the second order moments needed for the criteria (1) and (6) 
where X θ A/B = X A/B cos θ + P A/B sin θ (θ = 0 or π/2). For LHV models, these can be written as
where λ are classical "hidden variable" parameters and P (λ) is the probability distribution for these parameters. The P (λ) is independent of the choice of measurement (θ and φ), which is made after the generation and separation of the subsystems. The X θ A λ is the average value for the result X θ A , given the hidden variable state specified by λ, and the X φ B λ is defined similarly. In the classical simulation of Figures 1, 3 and 4 , the Wigner variables x assume the role of Bell's hidden variables λ, W (x) becomes P (λ), and there is a deterministic situation whereby [26, 47] . A DVIEW would, like a Bell inequality, negate all LHV models of type (14) . Thus use of an DVIEW entanglement criterion would allow Charlie to detect entanglement, by eliminating all of the LHV models, and therefore represents a more secure test of entanglement [2, 3] . However, for the CV entanglement generated by the twomode squeezed state, a DVIEW cannot be constructed directly from the amplitude X and P measurements only, since the LHV model (14) describes the statistics perfectly in this case [26, 47] . We point out that, in view of the work of Banaszek and Wodkiewicz [48] , this does not exclude DVI entanglement witnesses being constructed from other sorts of measurements. Also, the violation of a Bell inequality has been shown possible using quadrature phase amplitudes measurements, for more complex EPR-type sources [49] .
IV. TWO TRUSTED MEASUREMENT STATIONS
It should be emphasised that Charlie can safely conclude genuine entanglement based on the criteria (1) and (6), if he can trust that the "measurement values" reported by Alice and Bob are genuinely the results of the quantum observablesX A/B andP A/B . Let us re-examine the derivation of the criteria, as outlined in Section II, to clarify this point.
Entanglement is defined as the failure of quantum separability. For any quantum separable state [46] , ρ AB = R P R ρ R A ρ R B , which implies the moments can be expressed as (on identifying R as a hidden variable λ)
where the x θ A λ and x φ B λ are additionally constrained to be the moments of quantum states ρ λ A and ρ λ B . Each predetermined local state (as specified by λ) is required to satisfy the quantum uncertainty relations. It is this fact which prevents a perfect correlation between Alice and Bob's "real" positions and momenta − unless there is entanglement. The criteria (1) and (6) falsify the quantum separable model (15), but not the local hidden variable model (14) .
In the classical simulation based on (14) , the predetermined local states are given by the classical numbers {x A , p A }, {x B , p B }, all of which are predetermined with perfect accuracy: That is, they are not constrained by the uncertainty relation. If Alice and Bob's detectors have been tampered with or are unreliable, the values reported could arise from such a classical simulation in which case there can be an unlimited number of replica sets {x B , p B } distributed. Figure 1 but now Alice can be trusted to report to Charlie the results of measurements of genuine quantum observablesXA andPA. Bob however cannot be trusted. Entanglement satisfying the Duan-Simon criterion (1) can still be faked using the asymmetric hybrid protocol depicted, involving the computer and a coherent state light source |α (where α = xA + ipA) that is deviously inputed to Alice's site (Figure 3, curve (c) ). The entanglement detected by the EPR criterion (6) however cannot be faked by one-sided scenarios where Alice is trusted (Figure 3, curve (d) ). If violated in the one-sided scenario, the EPR criterion detects genuine entanglement, and (through the monogamy result (20)) gives security against all processes that would allow distribution of the amplitude values. In the picture, Alice measures the quadrature amplitudesXA and PA of the field at her location using a standard homodyne measurement scheme, whereby the field is combined across a beam splitter with an intense local oscillator field (denoted ELO). The variable phase shift θ allows her to choose whether XA orPA is measured.
V. ONE TRUSTED MEASUREMENT STATION
We now turn to the case where one measurement station, that of Alice, can be trusted. In this scenario, we will show that the use of the one-sided DVIEW criterion (6) enables reliable witnessing of entanglement: That is, faked entanglement is detected as "notentangled", and the criterion is only satisifed when there is genuine entanglement. We expect the one-sided entanglement witness to be useful, since protocols are often asymmetric with one station being secure than the other [31, 33] . Any classical LHV model (14) becomes constrained, if the moments generated from it are to be consistent with statistics arising from this new scenario. The moments are given by a separable model
where only x θ A λ is constrained to be consistent with a quantum density operator ρ λ A [33] . Unlike for the model (15) , there is no similar constraint on B. This hybrid separable model, which is a superset of all quantum separable models (15) , is called a Local Hidden State (LHS) model. The falsification of this model indicates the nonlocality of "quantum steering" [33, 34] . It has been proved in Ref. [35] that the EPR inequality EPR A|B ≥ 1 holds for all LHS models (16) . We have outlined this proof in Section II. Hence, the EPR criterion (6) (which shows an "EPR steering" of Alice's system) negates all of the classical LHS models (16) . In this way, entanglement is demonstrated, without the assumption of quantum measurements for the values reported at Bob's location. On the other hand, the LHS model (16) does not imply the entanglement criterion (1). In short, statistics generated by a LHS model (16) can satisfy the entanglement criterion (1), but cannot satisfy the EPR paradox criterion (6) .
We give a demonstration (Figure 2 ) of how Charlie can be mislead into thinking there is entanglement, if he uses the wrong criterion for this scenario whereby only Alice can be trusted. Bob in collusion with Eve may set up the following protocol. Alice would be expecting (at each trial or time t i of the sequence) an input to her station, corresponding to the subsystem of the entangled state sent by Charlie. This subsystem may take the form of an optical beam or pulse, the mode corresponding to A in the two-mode squeezed state (10) . Her station is secure, so Eve and Bob cannot tamper with it. Instead, they decide to tamper with the input. Inputed to Alice's station at each trial are the values x A , p A that stem from the central classical computer source, as before. However, these cannot be the final inputs, as Alice passes on to Charlie only the results of genuine quantum measurementsX A , P A , made locally on a real experimental system. Bob then comes up with a hybrid protocol: Alice's experimental system is deviously coupled to the input values, so that the measurements she reports are those ofX A ,P A on the quantum coherent state |α where α = x A + ip A . For example, the optical beam or pulse that arrives at Alice's station is not the subsystem A of the entangled state (10), but the optical coherent state |α . The statistics from this hybrid classical scenario are describable by an LHS model (16) . Although the extra local quantum uncertainty provided by the coherent state means that Bob and Eve cannot predict exactly the values that Alice will report, the correlation with the values x B , p B (which they do know) is good enough that the inequality of the Duan-Simon criterion (1) is satisfied (though not maximally). This makes it possible to a fake entanglement certified by the Duan-Simon criterion.
The results of carrying out Bob and Eve"s protocol are given in Figure 3 . In our simulation, Alice does not actually measure the amplitudes of the optical coherent state. Instead, we model the outcomes of her local measurement using standard quantum theory. We note that the simulation results are in agreement with the predictions of a two-mode squeezed state (10) which is then coupled at Alice's location to a local quantum noise source. The final mode for Alice's values is X A = X A + X coh where X coh , X coh = 1/4. Calculation gives
where n = X A , X A = 
2 is given by the minimum value of [∆(X A −g epr X B )] 2 = n+g 2 epr m−2g epr c where g epr is a real constant [27] . Selecting g epr = c/m, we find
which, consistent with our knowledge of the LHS model (16) , cannot satisfy (6). Yet, we see (Figure (3) ) that the entanglement criterion (1) is satisfied for all values of r.
We remark that all of the "EPR steering" inequalities [35, 50, 51 ] that falsify the model (16) will suffice as one-sided DVIEW [31] . One such criterion is [27, 52] Ent < 0.5 (19) as evident in Figure ( 3). However, for Gaussian states and measurements, the EPR criterion (6) has been shown necessary and sufficient, whereas the criterion (19) is not [33, 34] . The EPR criterion is therefore generally more sensitive, as has been shown useful when asymmetry exists between the stations of Alice and Bob [53] [54] [55] [56] . The entropic EPR steering criteria of Ref. [51] are likely to be useful in more complex scenarios. In summary, if Charlie establishes that the statistics reported to him give an EPR paradox EPR A|B < 1 and he trusts Alice's values, then he can be sure that there is genuine entanglement between the two observers. If his data falls in the region of entanglement but with no EPR paradox, he cannot be sure of this. The statistics could be consistent with a classical protocol, and the values x A , p A known to an infinite number of parties (Figure 2 ).
VI. SECURITY AND THE MONOGAMY OF THE EPR PARADOX
In confirming a genuine EPR paradox, Charlie can deduce the security of the amplitude values, based on a knowledge of quantum mechanics. As with Bell's nonlocality [10, 57, 58] , the EPR paradox satisfies a very strict form of monogamy. It is always true that (unless quantum mechanics fails or we cannot trust Alice's devices)
where E is any other system measured by an eavesdropper, Eve [20, 39, 40] . The monogamy relation (20) is derived based on the assumption of the uncertainty principle forX A ,P A , and is one-sided DVI, that is, is valid no matter what devices or measurements are used by Bob, or Eve. Similar to the relations introduced in Refs. [31, 59] , the mere measurement of EPR A|B allows Charlie to deduce the level of security of the correlation between Alice and Bob's amplitudes. If EPR A|B < 1 then EPR A|E > 1, and the conditional variances that give the noise levels on Eve's inferences of Alice's amplitudes is increased by an amount known to Charlie.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Here, we have demonstrated the principle of one-sided device-independent quantum security as applied to continuous variables. We believe this principle could expedite the practical application of device-independent cryptography and may lead to more secure protocols in CV quantum information.
We have shown that one-sided device-independent security is possible, using the widely available two-mode squeezed state CV EPR source and quadrature phase amplitude measurements. The detection of entanglement using the EPR steering criterion is well documented in the literature, and has been achieved without detection loophooles (though not as yet without locality loopholes). This quadrature amplitude EPR steering has been realised in a number of different optical scenarios [26, 41, 42, 61, 62] , most of which are explained in the review of Ref. [27] . Also, more recently, very high degrees of EPR steering correlation have been reported [43] . Significant for application to quantum communication protocols is that the CV EPR steering criterion has been verified for pulses propagating through optical fibres [60] , and has now been confirmed for spatially entangled optical modes and networks [63] [64] [65] .
The biggest drawback to any practical implementation is the relative lack of robustness of the EPR paradox criterion to losses. It has been shown theoretically using monogamy relations that the criterion cannot be satisfied when there is 50% or more loss of the intensity received by the steering (untrusted) party [40] . For losses up to 50% on this channel, however, the criterion has been experimentally verified [41, 42] . On the other hand, the criterion is quite robust with respect to the losses on the trusted party [41, 53, 54] . As detection can be done very efficiently using homodyne techniques, the greatest problem is likely to be the losses that enter on transmission. This may make the choice of location of the trusted and untrusted measurement stations important, as has been discussed in relation to applications of photonic steering [31, 66] . All this gives promise however to the prospect of utilising CV one-sided device-independent witnesses for quantum information tasks.
It is stressed that two-sided device-independent entanglement witnesses could also be applied to CV scenarios. However, these may require more complicated measurements and protocols.
